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Abstract
This article asks a basic question of organizational evolution:
When and where will a new organizational form emerge? Using
a definition of organizational forms as external identity codes,
we focus on two answers drawn from contemporary organiza-
tion theory. The first holds that formal institutions such as in-
dustry associations and standard-setting bodies will result in a
taken-for-granted organizational form. The second answer con-
tends that increasing organizational density (number of orga-
nizations) will generate a legitimated organizational form. As
reported here, a historical case study of the disk array market
and its associated technologies finds both arguments limited.
Although significant collective activity in association building
and standard setting occurs among disk array producers, these
have not yet led to an organizational form. Similarly, an ob-
served trajectory of organizational density showing rapid
growth followed by stabilization has not yet generated an or-
ganizational form. In our view, the diversity of origins and other
activities of those organizations operating in this market work
against institutionalization of the disk array organizational
form. We reason that if firms in the market derive their primary
identities from other activities (implying that there are few
highly focused firms deriving their primary identity from disk
arrays), then the disk array producer identity cannot cohere into
a code or form. This conclusion suggests a respecification of
the legitimation component of the density-dependent model of
organizational evolution.
(Organizational Form; Identity; Disk Drive Arrays; Form Emergence;
Technological Change)
Organizational theorists and researchers use the organi-
zational form concept in many ways, often without pre-
cise definition. Here we build on a recent attempt to define
and theorize about organizational forms in rigorous fash-
ion, using the tools of logical formalization (Po´los et al.
1998a and b, 1999, 2002; Carroll and Hannan 2000). We
do so by tracing the possible emergence and development
of a potential new organizational form. The goal is to gain
insight into the processes that generate and establish or-
ganizational forms and, ultimately, to develop systematic
theory about those processes. We also hope to sharpen
understanding of differences among various uses of the
form concept.
Our research strategy is unconventional. It involves
identifying and documenting a type of product—disk
drive arrays—for which there is a large market but which
may or may not spawn an institutionalized organizational
form by our definition. In other words, we chose a poten-
tial organizational form in midstream. We did so to catch
the form-generating processes in action and to minimize
retrospective bias problems that would arise by choosing
an established form. Whether the product and its market
will eventually produce an organizational form or not is
beside the point: We do not regard this effort as an ex-
ercise in theory testing. Rather, we believe that examining
in detail the “facts” surrounding an emergent organiza-
tional form should be highly informative and useful for
generating ideas and developing theory, regardless of the
eventual outcome. Implicit in our research is the notion
that sustained long-term viability of disk drive array
(hereafter, disk array) producers depends not only on the
technological features of array products, but also on es-
tablishment of the array organizational form.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section,
we review and explain the Po´los et al. (1998a and b, 1999,
2002) definition of organizational form. We also discuss
two general processes that organizational theorists often
suggest might be behind the emergence and development
of an organizational form. The following section briefly
explains our research approach, including why we do not
think that disk array producers currently represent a le-
gitimated organizational form, and describes disk array
technology and its markets. We then review the early his-
tory of disk arrays with an eye to the origins of the con-
cept and product. Next we describe the various industry
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associations that have been established in this area. Fol-
lowing that, we move to a description of the firms that
have been involved in disk array production, looking at
entry and exit patterns. Then, we discuss again the two
relevant theories in light of the descriptive evidence. This
exercise suggests the theories have some limitations and
leads us to advance a new argument, one that differs from
other current efforts. We conclude by discussing the im-
plications of our research.
Organizational Form:
Concepts, Definitions, and Theory
A decade ago, Romanelli (1991) reviewed the literature
on the emergence and establishment of new organiza-
tional forms. She reported that “no theoretical consensus
exists regarding an approach to the problem” and that “the
conceptual approaches are diverging” (Romanelli 1991,
p. 81). At an even more basic level, Romanelli found no
accepted common definition of the form concept in use.
She concluded that although many theoretical arguments
about form emergence had been formulated, there were
“no overarching themes for integrating these perspec-
tives” (Romanelli 1991, p. 100).1 Romanelli advised or-
ganizational theorists to embrace the conceptual diver-
sity, to emphasize differences among concepts, and to
demonstrate the value of various definitions through the-
oretically directed empirical research.
In the ten years since Romanelli’s survey, we believe
that the definition and use of organizational form has be-
come, if anything, more elastic. Consider, for example,
the 1999 Organization Science “focused issue” on new
organizational forms. The editors of that issue never de-
fined the term, but in articles it was variously equated
with population, industry, M-Form, functional form, di-
visional form, matrix form, virtual corporation,
boundary-less organization, hollow corporation, dynamic
network form, cellular organization, hypertext organiza-
tion, platform organization, and shamrock organization.
Given this state of affairs, we think that organization
theory could still benefit from attention to the form con-
cept. As Romanelli (1991, pp. 81–82) notes, at the broad-
est level, “the concept of organizational form refers to
those characteristics of an organization that identify it as
a distinct entity and, at the same time, classify it as a
member of a group of similar organizations.” Indeed,
many proposed definitions are abstract to the point of be-
ing vague, and thus lack bite. For example, McKelvey
(1982, p. 107) first defines form as “a concept to broadly
capture the character of an organization’s structure, func-
tion and process.” He then later redefines it as “that which
is measured by taxonomic characters” and suggests that
“the best strategy for selecting taxonomic characters is to
measure everything possible” with an emphasis on “char-
acters associated with dominant competence and evolu-
tionary/ecological importance” (McKelvey 1982, p. 214).
The most common type of form definition bases ideas
on specific features of organizations (Carroll and Hannan
2000). This type of representation can be traced to
Weber’s rational-legal bureaucracy, which he defined in
terms of the following features: authority, procedures,
and the employment relation of the official. The feature-
based conception of form has evolved to recognize that
some features—so-called “core” features—are more im-
portant than others in distinguishing forms. Organizations
with the same core features belong to the same form, by
this view. A second common definition reflects the pre-
sumption that distinctions among forms reflect social pro-
cesses and boundary creation (Hannan and Freeman
1989). In this view, the clarity and strength of social
boundaries define forms—sharp boundaries generate
clear forms. The processes that create and maintain
boundaries are thus key to understanding forms, includ-
ing social networks, technological change, closed flows
of personnel among a set of organizations, changes in
patterns of resource flows, and the like. In this vein, Clegg
and Hardy (1996, pp. 8–11), in the Handbook of Orga-
nization Studies, identify several “new forms of organi-
zation,” including chains, clusters, networks, and strate-
gic alliances.
In the view of Po´los et al. (1998a, 1999, 2002), both
of these common types of definitions of form have limi-
tations, the most serious of which is the failure to link
forms and identities (also see Ruef 1999). By their view,
the classification of organizational entities into types (that
is, the form classification rules) is not a process divorced
from the social world. Rather, the process involves social
and cultural typifications—widely agreed-upon classifi-
cations of entities into types (Meyer and Rowan 1977,
Scott 1995). Efforts to understand such typifications in
empirical research on diverse kinds of organizations sug-
gest that such processes build upon identities (Ruef
2000).
Our research follows Romanelli’s (1991) suggestion to
demonstrate the value of specific definitions of form
through empirical research rather than try to incorporate
many meanings into a single analysis. Accordingly, we
use the conceptual approach of Po´los et al. (2002), which
seeks to define identity and form in closely related terms.
These analysts embed the concept of organizational form
in a theory of social action, making the perceptions and
actions of social actors as they encounter organizations
pivotal.2 More specifically, they view a form as a rec-
ognizable pattern that takes on rulelike standing in the
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social world and is normatively sanctioned (Meyer and
Rowan 1977). They call such a pattern a “code.” The term
code denotes and connotes both cognitive recognition and
imperative standing. A code can be understood as (1) a
set of signals, as in the “genetic code” and (2) as a set of
rules of conduct, as in the “penal code.”
By Po´los et al.’s (2002) definition, a form is an external
identity code, meaning that it is the perceptions and opin-
ions of outsiders that matter. The external identity code
possesses rulelike status. This means that its observable
violation is negatively sanctioned—it causes outsiders to
drop discontinuously their valuation of the entity to which
it is applied.3 The valuation involved in the process is not
a judgement about social worth or merit but about con-
formity to the relative default code. So, illegal or immoral
organizations may be subject to codes as much as legal
or charitable organizations. Identity codes may consist of
specific abstract features of organizations as well as com-
position rules that tell about appropriate combinations of
features.
Forms apply to multiple entities (organizations here)
and persist better than ordinary identities. Among other
reasons for this persistence, an established form gets its
identity embedded in other societal institutions such as
languages, directories, and public labels. When one looks
at the yellow pages of the phone book, for instance, a
very basic set of organizational forms is given by (many,
but not all of) the entries. For more technical industries
such as disk arrays, it is useful to look at how technical
and buyer-oriented publications group firms, how com-
panies refer to themselves and their products in adver-
tisements and other public announcements, and how gate-
keepers to critical resources such as capital and labor
categorize firms.
Forms can be graded in terms of their degrees of spec-
ificity or sharpness. Forms might also be hierarchically
nested with respect to each other. If so, then systems of
forms may appear as semi-lattices, trees, diamonds, or
other structures. These are questions of structural shape
in the systems of forms. The degree of specificity in form-
to-form relations is also an important issue, whatever the
shape of a system. For example, a tree-shaped system
might contain few vertical levels but have wide horizontal
branches (wide spans). Conversely, a tree form might be
narrow at each level but deep vertically.
The Po´los et al. (2002) focus on identity in defining
form embraces the insights of institutional theory (Meyer
and Rowan 1977, Scott 1995), but it differs from many
other definitions.4 As mentioned above, for example, one
use of form refers to a cluster of features, often embodied
in a structural architecture. But structural architectures—
such as the M-form or the network form—are not really
forms by this view: Organizations can change their ar-
chitecture without changing their form, and architectures
vary within forms. Nor is an organizational form synon-
ymous with a market by this view. There are markets for
all kinds of products and services, but not all markets
define social and cultural typifications. Only some mar-
kets represent instances of meaningfully bounded forms.
Why does the institutional classification of an organi-
zational form matter? As the anthropologist Douglas
(1986, p. 103) notes about a similar classification system
for persons: “Something happens to the insides of our
heads when a different kind of organization had made
obsolete the old classifications. . .The change is not a
deliberate or conscious choice. Institutions veil their in-
fluence, so that we hardly notice any change.” For clas-
sification of organizational forms, virtually all contem-
porary theories assign a privileged status to
institutionalized (as opposed to uninstitutionalized) or-
ganizational forms. The returns to institutionalization in-
clude ease of resource mobilization and survival advan-
tages. For example, Hannan and Carroll (1992, pp. 36–
37) argue:
. . .a taken for granted social form can be more readily visualized
by potential organizers than one with dubious or unknown
standing. Variations in the strength of institutional rules en-
dorsing rational organization as the appropriate vehicle for at-
taining collective goals affect the ease of founding organiza-
tions. The capacity to mobilize potential members and resources
increases greatly when those who control resources take the
organizational form for granted. Reducing the need for such
justifications lowers the cost of organizing. . .Legitimation eases
the problem of maintaining flows of resources from the envi-
ronment and enhances the ability of organizations to fend off
challenges.
A business illustration of the operation of these forces
can be found in a recent account in the Wall Street Jour-
nal about Reuters, a media company founded in the 19th
century and now engaged in a variety of Internet busi-
nesses as well (Goldsmith 1999). The problem is that in-
vestors cannot agree on how to classify Reuters and there-
fore how to value the company:
. . .even the most seasoned media-sector investors concede that
they are less than secure when evaluating Reuters. ‘We built a
huge [earnings] model. . .,’ said Mark Beilby, an analyst in
London with Germany’s Deutsche Bank. ‘We’re confident with
it’ for many media companies, ‘but we don’t know whether it
works or not for Reuters.’ Other firms express similar uncer-
tainty (Goldsmith 1999).
The result has been a high volatility on Reuters’ stock
prices, often with huge losses occurring for no particular
reason except the classification uncertainty.
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The structural shape of a system of forms also matters.
One useful way to think about this issue involves asking
what advantages might accrue to a hierarchically embed-
ded subform as compared to a stand-alone form. Orga-
nizational subforms might be advantageous because of
the following processes: lessened need to justify claims
made to outside resource controllers (because of possible
use of precedence arguments); possibility of protective
action by entities from the superform (because of soli-
darity and perceived common interests); ease of recruit-
ing members and other resources (because outsiders as-
sociate with established superform); ease of interaction
with outside exchange partners and regulators (because
partners can use existing subunits and routines to interact
rather than develop new ones). Note that these processes
generate hierarchy because of environmental selection
but the individuals behind form-based entities may un-
derstand such forces and be capable of some limited stra-
tegic placement of forms.
Two Theoretical Processes Generating Forms:
Analytical Frames
As Romanelli (1991) noted, theories about the emergence
of organizational forms abound. Yet once any particular
definition or concept of form is chosen, many of these
become moot. For instance, given our definition of form,
it makes no sense for us to tend to explanations regarding
form as, say, organizational governance structure. So, we
concentrate on two relevant general theoretical ideas—
analytical frames in Ragin’s (1994) language—about the
processes behind the emergence of an organizational
form as we define it.5
First, many theorists stress the role of formal institu-
tions in establishing a new organizational form. In re-
viewing recent research, for instance, Scott (1995, p. 147)
notes that “new industries require the development of a
social and political infrastructure that provides working
rules, governance structures, and legitimacy.” Although
not explicit, it seems clear that in Scott’s (and other in-
stitutionalists’) thinking new industries are typically as-
sociated with new forms. The infrastructure referred to
includes industry associations, professional associations,
regulatory bodies, and the like. Among other things, these
institutions are viewed as providing social order and re-
ducing uncertainty, although some theorists stress the
control or domination aspects of prevailing institutions,
and others emphasize the ways norms are generated and
maintained (Scott 1995, Ingram and Simons 2000).
Industry associations typically play all these roles. In
the view of neocorporatists, such associations of orga-
nized interests generate a distinct source of social order.
They clarify the meanings of activities and technologies,
thus simplifying a complex and differentiated world.
They often establish and enforce standards. They defend
and protect their members’ interests, directly and by de-
fining appropriate responses to uncertainties. By grouping
firms together in a single entity, they foster information
exchange, facilitate recognition of mutual interests, and
provide a forum for common identity formation. Taken
together, these activities are commonly expected to en-
gender collective and organizational identity, that is, a
form as we define it. In this vein, Miner and Haunschild
(1995) claim that trade associations are population-level
routines that help organizational populations survive as
well as maintain credibility among consumers. According
to Ingram and Simons (2000, pp. 30–31), the activities of
associations “can be understood as benefiting organiza-
tions by smoothing exchange between them by facilitat-
ing credible commitments. . .or enabling collective ac-
tion.” They go on to claim that “the effect of federation
membership may go beyond exchange smoothing to in-
clude, in some form, the. . .ways the state affects orga-
nizations,” including the definition of organizational pro-
priety.
A good example of an industry association that assisted
in the emergence of an organizational form can be found
among American craft brewers, who went outside the on-
going industry association of major brewers to found the
Institute of Brewing Studies (IBS) in Boulder, Colorado.
The IBS was instrumental in providing information on
microbreweries and brewpubs to both the public and to
potential entrepreneurs; in lobbying effort to gain legal
status for small brewers in various states; in setting stan-
dards for brewers, breweries, and products; and in ex-
plicitly defining and fostering the organizational form
identities associated with contemporary craft brewing.
Second, other theorists—specifically, those working
from an ecological perspective (e.g., Carroll and Hannan
2000)—highlight the role of organizational proliferation
in establishing a form. The theory of density-dependent
organizational evolution states that as the number of or-
ganizations using a particular organizational blueprint in-
creases, the blueprint becomes a legitimated organiza-
tional form. Empirical tests of the argument typically use
a count of the number of producer organizations in a mar-
ket (density) as the indicator of the prevalence of a par-
ticular blueprint. Either a rise in founding rates or a drop
in failure rates is taken as evidence of legitimation. How-
ever, many ecological researchers also provide social his-
tories describing in detail the ways a form emerges and
proliferates with initial rises in organizational density.
Although these theoretical ideas are not fully devel-
oped or entirely specified, we do think they reflect the
state of contemporary theory about forms. Rather than
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sharpen them in advance and present our efforts here as
definitive tests, we took them as guides or frames to the
case study. This orientation accords with that of much
exploratory social research, which attempts to generate
and develop new ideas rather than test existing theories
(Ragin 1994). Accordingly, we think that the case study
reveals some interesting things about both general theo-
retical approaches. As explained below, it also leads us
to advance a new theoretical argument about the estab-
lishment of organizational forms, one that we think merits
systematic empirical investigation.
Before we get to the new argument, however, we elab-
orate our research approach, explaining why we chose to
study disk array producers. We also discuss why we do
not think disk array producers constitute a form even if
we nonetheless identified them as a distinct group of or-
ganizations for study in the first place. It is also important
to understand what disk drive arrays are and how they
developed, and to examine the relevant empirical facts
associated with both theoretical approaches. The next
four sections of the article aim to accomplish these tasks.
They provide (in order) an overview of our research ap-
proach, including a discussion of the design and methods
used, a description of disk array technology and an as-
sessment of the producers’ status as an organizational
form, a historical narrative of its development, a descrip-
tion of the formal associations found in disk arrays, and
an examination of organizational density and its under-
lying vital processes. After setting up the analysis with
these facts, in the final section of the article we confront
the two guiding theoretical approaches with them.
Research Design and Methods
Although both institutional and ecological theorists claim
ample empirical support for their general explanations of
form emergence, a problematic aspect of much research
on this question is that typically only established forms
are selected for study.6 Empirical investigation takes the
form of retrospective data collection and analysis in
searching for the processes that generated and established
the form. Of course, such an approach may be very in-
sightful in understanding what occurred and how it hap-
pened, but it is limited in terms of its ability to establish
causality. The problem is that the “independent variables”
are identified only after the outcome is known. Thus,
these variables may not have produced the outcome—
they could be spurious; they also could very well be nec-
essary but not sufficient causal factors. Given the number
of replications of each type of study, the latter interpre-
tation seems more plausible than the former.
The research reported here was designed to gain some
leverage on this thorny inference problem. We used the
two general theoretical approaches described above as
theoretical orienting ideas or analytical frames (Ragin
1994). That is, in examining disk arrays, we looked for
and assembled information on both formal institutions
and organizational density. We present these data below and
use them to inform the theoretical ideas, much as other
studies do. However, because the disk array form is not
yet fully established, our study avoids—or at least
changes—the dominant retrospective analysis problem
for at least two reasons. First, disk array production may
not eventually become an organizational form. Second,
even if disk array producers become a form, by observing
before its establishment we might learn something about
the sufficient (as well as the necessary) conditions of pro-
cesses generating it.
Case Context: Description, Selection,
and Data Collection
We expect that many readers will be unfamiliar with disk
arrays. That is not surprising, because one of the things
associated with institutionalized organizational forms is
widespread awareness of what organizations with the
form produce and do (Hannan and Carroll 1992; Scott
1995). Disk arrays are a particular type of technological
solution to data storage problems and are but one of sev-
eral major technological options facing those in the data
storage market, including optical drives, hard drives, and
tapes. Customers find them attractive because they pro-
vide reliable online access to large databases at low cost.
They are also widely used: Industry data show that over
$12.6 billion of disk array products were sold in 1998
(see Table 1).
The main technical components of a disk array are:
(1) a set of disk drives, (2) configuration of the drives into
some kind of interdependent system, (3) the interconnect
protocols in the system, (4) the storage controller, and
(5) the system cache architecture. The business of disk
arrays appears even more complicated because arrays are
sold with varying degrees of completeness (Disk/Trend
1998). A number of companies sell subsystems (complete
arrays ready to use), but product groups also include
boards (array controllers, power supplies, and other com-
ponents without disk drives), and software (an individual
software product providing array functionality). Thus,
companies may specialize in boards or software, or else
they may provide complete systems. Companies may also
be independent providers, or else be captive producers
making arrays for their own computer systems.
The market for disk arrays is segmented in a number
of ways, and firms differ in the scope of their offerings.
Arrays are sold in four identifiable primary markets: the
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Table 1 Worldwide Sales Revenues of Disk Drive Arrays (in Millions of U.S. Dollars)*
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Single user systems 2.8 16.7 16.0 32.5 38.6 32.7 38.4
Networks/Midrange systems 1207.5 2506.5 3821.0 5418.9 6704.3 7884.1 9210.4
Mainframe systems 259.8 867.4 1853.0 4263.3 3958.4 3556.8 3221.0
Specialized high performance systems 17.9 44.8 54.6 74.1 58.3 97.2 106.8
Total 1,488.0 3,435.4 5,744.6 9,788.8 10,759.6 11,530.8 12,576.6
*Sources: Disk/Trend Reports for 1993–1999.
computer mainframe array market (e.g., computer reser-
vation systems), the network/midrange multiuser market
(the bulk of the disk array market), the single-user market,
and the specialized high-performance market (e.g., video
servers, geophysical exploration data analysis). A disk
array can have as few as two disk drives or as many as a
couple of hundred; most arrays contain fewer than 100
drives.
This market also cuts another way. Array companies
serve particular operating environments such as UNIX,
NT, NetWare, OS/2, other proprietary environments, and
open environments; they may specialize or serve multiple
environments. Increasingly, disk arrays comprise ele-
ments in a storage system, which is, in turn, an element
in a network of interacting servers, specialized servers,
and client systems/users. Among their other functions,
disk arrays form one of the legs underpinning the Internet;
without arrays, the Internet could not function effectively.
During 1998, 134 companies offered array subsystems,
boards, or software at one time or another. However, three
firms—IBM, EMC, and Compaq Computer—held almost
three-quarters of the total market (Disk/Trend 1998). Led
by IBM and Compaq, captive sales accounted for almost
two-thirds of industry revenue. EMC was the largest non-
captive supplier, accounting for more than half of non-
captive sales, followed by Data General and Hitachi Data
Systems.7 U.S. firms hold 90% of the market.
Our recognition of the disk array market as a good
context for exploring the form research question came as
a consequence of our work on a larger project examining
the evolution of all the data storage industries (see
McKendrick et al. 2000 for an analysis of hard disk drive
producers). In the course of this project, we received a
set of annual reports on disk arrays produced by Disk/
Trend, Inc., a market research company in Mountain
View, California. As we began studying the technology,
researching its market, coding data on participating firms,
and interviewing industry participants, it became appar-
ent to us that the disk drive array producer is not an or-
ganizational form by the Po´los et al. (1998a, 1999) defi-
nition of the term.
Organizational Form Status
How do we know that the organizational form for disk
array producers is not yet established? As Ruef (2000)
notes, organizational forms emerge over time as a social
process and a specific form’s actual emergence cannot
always be readily demarcated by an exact date or a par-
ticular organizational event. Nonetheless, it is often pos-
sible to ascertain a form’s status at any particular point
in time and to observe dramatic relative changes in status
across two or more points. For instance, in the early 1980s
when brewpubs first appeared in various local areas, op-
erators often went to great lengths in developing pro-
motional materials and service routines intended to ex-
plain the form to customers and others. The explanations
usually included information on what the form was, how
it differed from other “neighbor” forms (large mass pro-
duction brewing firms), and why it was important. By the
late 1990s, these explanations had typically fallen by the
wayside: Individuals knew the form by name and easily
recognized instances of it by sight and other perceptual
tools. The establishment of the brewpub form was pro-
pelled by the fact that there was general agreement about
the concept among early entrepreneurs, many of whom
maintained contact with each other. This consensus by
insiders undoubtedly made it easier to lobby for enabling
legislation and to launch collective events and formal as-
sociations, all of which served to create awareness and
understanding among outsiders.
When examining the disk array market today, we do
not find much apparent agreement about the organiza-
tional form most appropriate for serving it. Although
Disk/Trend classified disk arrays as a single industry,
which might suggest an institutionalized form, in the
course of our research it quickly became apparent that
this classification scheme was only one of several ways
participants and outsiders perceive the market. For ex-
ample, Disk/Trend covered only producers that offered
products that met the strict technological definitions of a
“disk array” listed in Appendix A. It ignored producers
that may have integrated that technology into subsystems
DAVID G. MCKENDRICK AND GLENN R. CARROLL On the Genesis of Organizational Forms
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE/Vol. 12, No. 6, November–December 2001 667
for resale or offered similar products, which some other
analysts tracked.
Although some relevant outsiders such as security
firms’ market analysts still refer to (or focus on) a disk
array (or similarly termed) industry, many others prefer
instead to stay at the more encompassing level of “data
storage” (see Tucker Anthony 1998, Hambrecht and
Quist 1998). Moreover, these analysts’ reports usually do
not contain subgroupings based on the disk array form or
organizational type; instead, individual companies and
their particular technologies or product lines (e.g., video
or audio streaming, transaction processing, web caching)
are described.
Looking at insiders to the market, a similar lack of
consensus about appropriate form is evident. Companies
tend to refer to their particular technology as though it
will be at the center of activity in the future. So, for in-
stance, companies refer to themselves variously as in-
volved in “storage,” “storage subsystems,” “RAID,”
“disk arrays,” “network attached storage,” and others. As
the director of product marketing at Maximum Strategy
says, “Companies are starting to go away from saying
[disk arrays], and are instead talking about what they of-
fer. We provide high bandwidth” (Electronic Engineering
Times 1996).
Companies also give the strong impression that they
realize the importance of being associated with an insti-
tutionalized way of doing things. For example, there are
several different classes of disk array products, each
stressing different technologies and aspects of their per-
formance. One group of array manufacturers banded to-
gether to form a benchmarking group, the Storage Per-
formance Council. As the marketing manager for
Compaq commented, “We discovered there are a fair
number of performance numbers around the industry, all
quoting different figures, and most of them were
drummed up to make a specific product look good”
(TechWeb News 1998). The COO of Mylex claimed the
new council will enable the storage industry “to rely upon
a set of standard performance benchmarks that success-
fully measure the performance of products in their tar-
geted working environments” (Electronic Engineering
Times 1998). Such metrics would also “be critical to es-
tablishing baseline and improved performance curves that
will be meaningful to our customers,” said the director of
storage technology at Unisys (TechWeb News 1998).
Case Methodology
Ever mindful of the sample selection bias problem inher-
ent in most research designs about forms, the observa-
tions above sparked our interest in exploring the case to
develop theory about the form-generation process.
The research conducted in the course of the case study
used both structured and unstructured methods to collect
and interpret data. The structured methods include sys-
tematic collection of comprehensive, quantitative firm-
level and industry-level data for the entire history of the
market, as well as computerized searches of relevant tech-
nical literature. The unstructured methods include inter-
views and e-mail exchanges with experts and with nu-
merous company and industry officials, as well as perusal
of much company literature and advertisements. From
these sources, we built and analyzed an organizational
life-history dataset that covers all the firms ever to enter
the market. We also developed a historical narrative of
the technology and its market, paying special attention to
issues germane to our guiding theories. Both are de-
scribed below, albeit in abbreviated form.
Along with methodologists such as Ragin (1994), we
view the open-ended case study research design as es-
pecially good for exploring, rather than testing, theory.
Accordingly, we approached the case with an eye to the
issues highlighted by our guiding theoretical frames. We
compared the expectations of the theoretical ideas with
the relevant “facts” of the case. When we encountered
systematic evidence that ran against our expectations, we
sought to understand why and to develop an informed
theoretical answer. We used qualitative and unstructured
materials to come up with ideas and then looked to see if
they were consistent with our available systematic data.
Our activities within this stage of the research project can
be described as “reciprocal clarification,” which Ragin
(1994, p. 88) describes as: “research [that] clarifies con-
cepts (the key analytical frames) and empirical categories
in a reciprocal manner.” We believe that our findings de-
pend on data from both structured and unstructured types
of methods; neither method alone would have allowed us
to reach the conclusions that we do.
Historical Overview of Disk Arrays
and Related Technology
Disk array technology has been around for many years,
but its first appearance proves hard to pin down. Although
demand for storage reliability and performance is not
new, most analysts think the disk drive array business is.
The technology originates in the idea of redundant, or
fail-safe, computing when online transaction processing
began to emerge in the 1960s. Yet independent compa-
nies were slow to offer fail-safe disk storage products;
disk drives were bundled with computer systems for
which they were specifically designed. Thus, a market for
disk drive arrays was slow to develop. Disk array tech-
nology has coevolved, in rough chronological order, with
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Figure 1 Historical Summary of Developments in the Disk
Drive Array Market
1956 First disk drive.
1965 First controller handling multiple drives (IBM 2314
DASF).
1966–70 Disk drives now provided storage for online
processing, which became the dominant mode in
most systems. Data reliability achieved through
multiple copies on disk packs.
1971 The IBM 3330 facility improved data integrity by
extensive error detection and correction
capabilities.
1976 First Tandem fault-tolerant computer shipped.
1978 IBM receives U.S. patent for “System for Recovering
Data Stored in Failed Memory Unit.”
Mid-1980s First disk subsystem (multiple small form factor disk
drives for higher performance and capacity
storage) used for the PC environment.
1987 U.C. Berkeley “RAID” technical paper presented at
conference.
1988 First shipment of a disk drive array or “cluster” using
small form factor disk drives (5.25-inch).
1990 EMC offers the first disk array for mainframe storage
that incorporates 5.25-inch disks. Its Symmetrix
4200 Integrated Cached Disk Array (ICDA) is a 24-
gigabyte RAID system that replaces traditional 14-
inch disks.
1992 RAID Advisory Board established.
1997 Storage Networking Industry Association established.
fault-tolerant computing, the market for disk subsystems,
RAID (redundant arrays of inexpensive disks; “inexpen-
sive” was later changed to “independent”), and storage
networks of which disk arrays are one element. We briefly
review each. As a guide to the discussion, we provide
Figure 1—a timeline that shows key developments re-
garding the history of disk arrays.
Fault Tolerance
Reliability in computing was a problem from the begin-
ning of the computer industry, and initially the only so-
lution was to buy a second computer. This meant that
computer users would guarantee total computer uptime
with a minimum of delay by having two complete com-
puter systems; when one system broke down, the other
was used as a backup.
Military and space programs were the first users of
fault-tolerant computing, as well as an important source
of R&D funding. Commercial applications, however, ap-
pear to be the main drivers of the technology. Airlines
were among the first commercial customers for this prim-
itive kind of fault-tolerant computing. In the mid-1960s
it was common for airlines to have three computers to
handle their reservations systems, with three more stand-
ing by in case something went wrong.
Smaller customer firms could not afford the large fault-
tolerant systems. So, a market for less expensive fail-safe
computing emerged in the mid-1970s and early 1980s.
Pioneered by Tandem Computers, which shipped its first
redundant computer system in 1976 (a “multiminicom-
puter” system), the market for fault-tolerant online trans-
action processing grew rapidly. Unlike the systems that
preceded it, the Tandem computer could (with a high
probability) detect and recover from some classes of in-
ternal failures—mostly hardware, but occasionally soft-
ware errors, too—before failures affected the processing,
the database, or the end user.
Tandem’s success and the rising demand for fail-safe
and reliable systems invited entry by others. The leading
challenger was Stratus Computer, Inc., founded in early
1980 by a group of former Data General executives. A
clutch of other companies followed, and by the mid-
1980s a dozen or so vendors offered fault-tolerant sys-
tems. Most carved out niches rather than confront Tan-
dem and Stratus directly, and adopted diverse approaches
to fault tolerance.
With the exception of Hewlett-Packard, conventional
systems manufacturers did not move quickly to offer
fault-tolerant architectures. However, analysts speculated
at the time that new entrants specializing in fault-tolerant
computing would nonetheless find a difficult competitive
environment because buyers would be concerned about
compatibility with existing DEC and IBM systems, which
dominated the minicomputer and mainframe markets.
This turned out to be true. By 1985, with the exception
of Tandem and Stratus, all fault-tolerant system suppliers
ran into trouble, and most exited the market.
As a concept, fault tolerance focused on the nonstop
reliability of the entire computer system rather than the
availability of the stored data per se, but most fault-
tolerant computer manufacturers also built redundancy
into their data storage through a technique called “disk
mirroring.” Disk mirroring requires duplicate disk drives:
If a failure occurs on one disk, an up-to-date, accessible
copy of the data will exist on the mirrored disk. This was
an expensive solution to data protection in an online en-
vironment (as opposed to backing up data using magnetic
tape). Because mirroring required a duplicate set of stor-
age devices for keeping a duplicate file of all data, it dou-
bled the cost of storage.
Mirrored disks were generally found only in fault-
tolerant systems, and no arrays of mirrored disks were
marketed independently from systems. Until the late-
1980s, no specialist firms made “fault-tolerant” storage
devices. Although fault-tolerant system producers had the
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capability to offer redundancy in their disk subsytems,
few survived to offer disk drive arrays. By contrast, sev-
eral of the major systems manufacturers made the tran-
sition: IBM, DEC, NCR, Unisys, and Hewlett-Packard.
Disk Subsystems, Disk Arrays, and RAID
IBM appears to be the first company to focus specifically
on disk arrays as a means to improve the reliability of
storage. In 1978 it received a patent for an improved ar-
rangement for recovering and storing data on multiple
storage devices in the event one of the devices became
inoperable. The disk mirroring techniques then in use,
such as those performed by Tandem, were not suitable
for correcting or recreating long records that were in error
or unavailable; this meant mirroring was not a practical
commercial solution when the amount of data transferred
involved substantial time to transfer. IBM’s idea was to
subdivide a record into a number of segments and store
them on different “failure independent” drives. If one
drive failed, the segment on that drive could be recon-
structed.
IBM was slow to implement this idea, which germi-
nated for almost a decade. In the meantime, some inde-
pendent companies began to offer software products and
disk subsystems employing disk mirroring for the PC and
workstation markets. These products typically employed
two disk drives and one host; they also had somewhat
different objectives than the fault-tolerant systems then
in use for mainframes (Computerworld 1985). Where
fault-tolerant systems emphasized the role that mirrored
disks played in the protection of critical data, mirroring
was increasingly said to lead to better performance as
well. Industry participants and the business press began
to refer to bundles of mirrored disk drives as disk sub-
systems or, increasingly, disk arrays.
The first reference to disk arrays (that we can find)
appeared in 1986 and was a software solution offered by
Twincom, a Dutch-based company. It was followed by
seven other disk array offerings in 1987, including those
of six noncaptive companies: 1776, Atlantic Microsys-
tems, Core International, Ford/Higgins, Maximum Strat-
egy, and Micropolis, a disk drive manufacturer.8 Yet most
observers date the “origin” of the disk array “industry”
to a December 1987 U.C. Berkeley technical paper
(Patterson et al. 1987), which helped companies view and
classify disk array technology in a common way. The
Berkeley research was sponsored by the National Science
Foundation and supported by IBM, Sun Microsystems,
Intel, and DEC. Its point of departure was clearly IBM’s
1978 patent.
The Berkeley paper addressed a growing problem in
data storage. Storage devices could not keep up with the
speed of faster and faster CPUs; disk drives were a major
input/output (I/O) bottleneck in achieving rated processor
speed. Some disk drive producers argued that lashing to-
gether several small hard disk drives electronically in a
single subsystem would be the best solution to the prob-
lem. More specifically, performance would be enhanced
and costs reduced by combining multiple inexpensive
5.25-inch disk drives in lieu of the higher capacity 8-inch
and 14-inch drives that were used in mainframe and fault-
tolerant computer systems.
The Berkeley team argued that the only way to increase
performance to the required levels was by writing data
across several disks (“striping”) rather than to one. Pro-
prietary software would let the system regenerate infor-
mation stored on a drive that failed. Striping was an at-
tractive alternative to mirroring because it increased
overall throughput: Data could be written faster than
would be possible if one drive were dedicated to dupli-
cating data. Also, potential customers, in principle, liked
the idea of smaller disks because they were cheaper, gen-
erated less heat, and used less floor space than the stan-
dard mainframe disk size of 14 inches.
The Berkeley solution was a set of five arrangements
of arrays of small disks offering various levels of protec-
tion and known under the generic name RAID.9 These
are described in Appendix A.
Despite these developments, disk drive makers and
system builders still moved cautiously with disk array and
RAID technology. A common comment among experts
was, “It’s really hard to say whether or not this is a mar-
ket” (Electronic Business 1988). Many thought disk ar-
rays only represented an opportunity for companies al-
ready in the systems or disk drive business; a company
that based an entire business plan on it was thought to
have a lower chance for survival. As the founder of Aus-
pex said, “How do you get in between [disk] drive and
systems companies and make money?” (Electronic Busi-
ness 1988). Industry experts argued that widespread ac-
ceptance of disk arrays would have to contend with small
profit margins, an education process to get the market
excited (distributors and value-added resellers did not
know what disk arrays even were), as well as the threat
posed by the established computer companies. A more
fundamental concern was whether the technology repre-
sented a new product opportunity or only the repackaging
of existing disk drives with little added value. As a Data-
quest analyst commented at the time, “The sales effort to
educate the prospective customer base regarding the
benefits of array processing will be expensive” (Elec-
tronic Business 1988).
The RAID disk systems that initially appeared after the
publication of the Berkeley paper served the small server
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and minicomputer markets (Computer Weekly 1995). But
many analysts and mainframe computer users thought
these initial entrants were ahead of the market by about
two years because of concern about the reliability of 5.25-
inch drives and the fact that they could not tolerate the
high data rates required by mainframe users.
In fact, the market for disk arrays did not begin to at-
tract many entrants until the early 1990s. In August 1990,
EMC Corp. became the first company to ship a RAID
product into the mainframe market (Electronic News
1990, Computerworld 1990). After that fast start, EMC
became (and remains) the largest independent producer
of disk arrays, with 21% of the worldwide market in
1998. Follow-on entrants targeted a variety of users:
mainframe, workstation, and microcomputers, especially
for critical database applications on PC-based network
servers. But minicomputers and multiuser systems com-
prised the largest markets for arrays; Compaq, Lomas
Data, Storage Concepts, and Sequoia were early entrants
that served this market. Except for EMC, only Hitachi,
Control Data Systems, Unisys, and Storage Technology
offered RAID for mainframe storage before 1994.
By the mid-1990s, RAID systems were finding market
appeal beyond their initial application for the stock ex-
change, airlines, medicine, and major retail. There are
several reasons for this. First, the disk drive industry had
improved the reliability and performance of small form
factor disk drives, and had achieved tremendous econo-
mies of scale in producing them. These developments
translated into higher-performance disk arrays using
smaller and cheaper components. Second, operating sys-
tems and software applications consumed everincreasing
amounts of storage, driving demand for capacious sys-
tems. Finally, companies increasingly demanded contin-
uous online access to data, the so-called 247 phenom-
enon.
Network Attached Storage, Storage Area Networks
During the last five years, disk arrays employing RAID
technology have emerged as central elements in corporate
electronic communication networks. Companies are in-
creasingly integrating data storage with distributed com-
puting systems in an effort to access data from anywhere
in a network at any time. This requires RAID systems
that enable fast data-transfer rates while maintaining con-
tinuous fail-safe access throughout the network.
Disk array companies have come up with two ap-
proaches for incorporating storage into these networks:
Storage Area Networks and Network Attached Storage.
Disk array systems were originally server- or host-
attached storage devices—components in so-called Stor-
age Area Networks, or SANs. A SAN involves a separate
high-speed network to move information among storage
devices. In a SAN, users connect to the network through
a server and go through the server to access data. By
contrast, Network Attached Storage, or NAS, refers to a
disk array connected directly to the network backbone via
some generally accepted cable technology such as ether-
net, Fibre Channel, or asynchronous transfer mode. NAS
enables users to access data more quickly without affect-
ing the server’s processing function.
As these two approaches exemplify, technological
competition and uncertainty persist. Despite the estab-
lishment of RAID levels, a decade of product offerings,
and the rapidly growing demand for disk arrays by com-
panies that want to integrate their Internet data with
traditional business data, analysts still describe the
RAID market as fragmented and confusing to potential
customers.
Industry Associations Related
to Disk Arrays
We now turn to industry associations, pursuing evidence
relevant to the suggestion of some scholars that collective
action fosters the emergence of organizational forms
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994, Scott 1995, Ruef 2000). Specif-
ically, industry associations might potentially help fash-
ion and sustain new organizational form identities. In the
disk array market, two major industry groups have
emerged: the RAID Advisory Board (RAB) and the Stor-
age Networking Industry Association (SNIA). Table 2
shows the membership in RAB and SNIA. Disk array
companies show considerable variation in membership,
with the two groups reflecting overlapping rather than
nested sets of endorsed organizations, as we describe
next.
RAID Advisory Board
In August 1992, the RAID Advisory Board was formed
with ten members.10 Their main motivation was to reduce
the confusion caused by disk array companies, which
were making often contradictory or inconsistent claims
about the technology. RAB’s objectives were to clarify
RAID terminology, educate the market (particularly the
engineering community), and promote common interests
among operating system developers and standards bodies
for the fledgling industry.
One of the most pressing problems facing the Board
was customer confusion regarding RAID levels and per-
formance benchmarks. The five Berkeley RAID levels
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Table 2 Disk Array Companies by Membership in Industry
Associations, 1998
Company Name RAB SNIA
Adaptec,Inc X
ADIC X
Amdahl Corporation X X
American Megatrends,Inc X
Ancor Communications X
Andataco X
Ark Research Corporation XA
Artecon, Inc. XA
Auspex Systems XA
Axis Communications X
BellSouth XA
BMC Software X
Boole & Babbage XA
Box Hill Systems XA
Bull XA
Carnegie Mellon University X
Chaparral Technologies X
CLARiiON, A Data General Company X
CMD Technology, Inc. X X
Comm Vault Systems X
Compaq Computer Corporation X
Computer Associates International X
Computer Network Technology X
Computer Technology Review X
ConvergeNet Technologies X
Cope AG XA
Creative Design Solutions X
Crossroads Systems X
Data General Corporation X X
Digital Equipment Corporation X
Disc,Inc XA
Disk/Trend,Inc X XA
ECCS,Inc. X
EMC Corporation X X
ENDL Consulting X
Eurologic Systems Ltd. X
Exabyte Corporation X
Fujitsu Computer Products X
G2 Networks X
Gadzoox Networks XA
GENROCO,Inc. XA
Gordon Consultants X
Hewlett-Packard X
Hitachi Computer Products (America) Inc. X
Hitachi Data Systems X X
IBM Corporation X X
ICP-vortex Computersysteme GmbH X
Infortrend Corporation X
Integrix,Inc. X
Intel Corporation X
Intelliguard Software X
Table 2 (cont’d.)
Company Name RAB SNIA
Jems Data Unlimited, Inc. X
JMR Electronics, Inc. X
Legato Systems X
LSI Logic Corp. X X
McData Corporation X
Mercury Computer Systems X
Meridian Data,Inc. X
MTI Technology Corporation X X
Mylex Corporation X X
NEC Corporation X
Network Appliance XA
Novell, Inc. X
nStor Corporation X
ORCA Technologies X
Overland Data Inc. X
Pathlight Technology,Inc. X
Programmed Logic X
Proware Technology Corp. X
QLogic XA
Quantum X
RAID,Inc. X
Seagate Technology X
Seek Systems,Inc. X
Silicon Graphics XA
SMS Data Products Group XA
SOFTWORKS XA
Sony XA
Stac,Inc XA
Sterling Software XA
Storage Area Networks Ltd. X
Storage Computer Corporation X
StorageTek, Inc. X X
Sun Microsystems X
Syred Data Systems X
Technology Forums X
TeraStor Corporation X
Tricord Systems,Inc. X X
Trimm Technologies XA
Unisys Corporation X XA
United Digital Limited X
Veritas Software Corporation X X
Vinca XA
Vixel Corporation X
Note. For SNIA, XA denotes associate members.
had not been officially sanctioned by any standards
groups, and RAID levels were being implemented in dif-
ferent ways. It was not clear, for instance, that Level 1
was the same across products; a RAB-certified RAID
Level 1 product, by contrast, would inform the user of
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exactly what the product does. RAB produced a 100-page
book of RAID definitions and sold more than 1,000 cop-
ies during the first three months after its release.
Nonetheless, confusion about RAID levels continued.
A particular misunderstanding was that RAID levels were
hierarchical, that the higher the RAID level, the better the
system. RAB’s chairman said, “[T]he RAID levels have
done more to confuse people than anything else” (Mid-
range Systems 1993). In spite of 70% growth in disk array
sales in 1994, he claimed that the “increasing activity of
RAID technology is—not surprisingly—resulting in con-
fusion and misperception” (Computer Design 1994).
Another cause of confusion was the host of new prod-
ucts introduced claiming additional RAID levels. “Bogus
levels have been generated to describe products,” warned
the chairman of the RAB, in 1993 (Corporate Computing
1993). Just when RAB was trying to get people to un-
derstand the most prevalent levels (1—disk mirroring,
3—striping, and 5—parity and striping), new levels (6,
7, 10, and 51) further cluttered the market. These levels
were proprietary solutions not recognized by RAB. De-
mystifying RAID technology and getting agreement on
some standards were thought to be the key to increasing
RAID sales. According to RAB’s chairman, “Standardi-
zation is probably the biggest issue we face. It’s critical
to RAID’s growth, and it’s an exhaustive process” (LAN
Times 1995). But an analyst at Dataquest Inc. said that
the RAB faced a tough task in trying to convince the 100
or so RAID vendors to settle on standards. She said,
“We’ll probably see de facto standards, based on who can
build a better mousetrap” (LAN Times 1995).
RAB had some success in raising user awareness and
understanding of disk drive arrays and RAID. “There’s
no one out there like them [RAB],” said an analyst for
International Data Corp. “The industry does need some
sort of consortium to set standards for vendors, and the
RAB provides an ample forum or discussion of the topic
among manufacturers and users” (LAN Times 1995). But
the role of storage in computing continued to change rap-
idly, and the disk array market was not settling on RAID
as a central identity. In 1994, 55 companies were mem-
bers of RAB, by 1998 approximately 40 were (less than
a third of the population of disk array makers).
Storage Networking Industry Association
As networked computing and the Internet gained in im-
portance, disk array makers and industry analysts began
to focus more on the role of data storage within a network
rather than storage per se. Disk array producers, who had
been struggling to create a clear identity, suddenly found
themselves reshaping their images. They still offered disk
arrays employing RAID technologies, but they began to
be evaluated in terms of their role in broader networks.
The confusion with these approaches, combined with
the expectation of enormous sales growth, sparked the
formation of the Storage Networking Industry Associa-
tion (SNIA). Formed in October 1997, the SNIA is more
broadly focused than RAB, and its 80 members come
from the wider IT community; it sees itself as leading the
way for the storage networking “industry.”
The SNIA has two principal objectives. One goal is to
bring together a single community of various information
systems firms, systems integrators, and vendors to focus
on education and training in networked storage systems.
A second objective is to facilitate standards for commu-
nication between servers and storage devices. As the
SNIA chairman summarized
What we’re looking at doing is helping to provide the infrastruc-
ture, including the specifications and the first standard, for tying
together storage systems on the network, being able to aggregate
storage and present it to users from a showable perspective on
the network. We’re expecting to provide benefits across the
whole industry, [including] providing education and an infra-
structure for the industry to support this new paradigm of
shared-network storage systems. (Computer Dealer News
1998).
Although technical challenges abound, collective ac-
tion is also required from a marketing perspective. Ac-
cording to the SNIA president
Storage community leaders have not figured out how to develop
a market. . .We now must recognize that networking and storage
are systems industries. We need to effectively market our prod-
ucts by establishing connections with the IT community. . . .
SNIA is attempting to build an IT organization, not merely an
ad hoc standards organization (Mass Storage News 1998).
Both RAB and SNIA have succeeded in generating
awareness of disk arrays, but disk array producers still
have a rather diffuse identity. In some ways, technolog-
ical change has outpaced RAB’s efforts to promote the
RAID concept; the rapid emergence of distributed com-
puting has made disk arrays only one element in com-
munication networks. For its part, the SNIA focuses on a
broader organizational community than disk arrays, but
the association was formed too recently to have had much
visible impact. Either way, collective action has so far
failed to result in a clearly identifiable organizational
form.
Organizational Dynamics in the Disk
Array Market
Now we examine organizational activity in disk array
production, using systematic data collected on firms par-
ticipating in the disk array market. Our data collection
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Figure 2 Density of Producers in Disk Array Market by Year Figure 4 Exits of Producers in Disk Array Market by Year
Figure 3 Entries of Producers in Disk Array Market by Year
effort attempted to identify every firm that ever sold a
disk array product and the dates when it entered and ex-
ited the market (if it did so by the end of our observation
period, year’s end 1998). The procedures and sources we
used are described in Appendix B. Because of impreci-
sion in the sources, the data we use are precise only to
the year and not to months or specific dates within years.
Our attempt to reconstruct the organizational history of
the disk array market yielded a total of 258 firms. This
count begins in 1986 with the first firm in the market,
Twincom, which entered with software for disk mirror-
ing.11 It covers all firms known to offer disk arrays, up to
and including the eleven new entrants in 1998: Acard
Technology, ADI, Chaparral Network Storage, Creative
Design Solutions, Engrows, Lexias, OneofUs, Sagitta,
SMS Data Products Group, SoftRAID, and Synapsys
Digital.
Figure 2 shows a plot of annual organizational density
of disk array producers across the history of the technol-
ogy. It includes all firms that entered the market at any
time, regardless of level of activity or other activities of
the firm. Firms are removed from the density count when-
ever they exit the market, regardless of the reason.
The temporal trajectory of density visible in Figure 2
resembles that of many coherent organizational popula-
tions. As Carroll and Hannan (2000) review, the density
pattern of initial slow growth, followed by rapid growth
and then stabilization or decline appears in very diverse
sets of organizations operating in widely different con-
texts. What differs across organizational populations is
the timing of the various phases of the trajectory and their
peak levels. Many of the populations reviewed by Carroll
and Hannan (2000) exhibit much greater prolongation in
the different phases than seen here. The collection of disk
array producers is notable for the historical speed with
which the “full” pattern appears. Perhaps this is a result
of the fast pace of technological change in this market.
Perhaps too the recent downturn is only a temporary
phase that will eventually lead to renewed fast growth in
density.
What do the organizational dynamics of entry and exit
look like? Figure 3 plots the annual number of firms en-
tering the market for disk arrays while Figure 4 shows
the number of exits per year. Entries into a market often
show great fluctuations from year to year (see Carroll and
Hannan 2000). By contrast, the plot of entries of array
producers shows a more pronounced series-long pattern
than is typical of many familiar organizational popula-
tions. Nonetheless, although the years 1992–1994 gen-
erated more entries than those periods before or after, the
series is short enough to warrant caution in making in-
ferences. The plot of annual exits looks more typical; it
suggests that many of the bulge entrants in 1992–1994
operated for two to three years before exiting. However,
it would be premature to draw conclusions about tenure
dependence in the market from these aggregate data.
So, at this first casual glance, the disk array market
looks similar to many established organizational popu-
lations in terms of density and exit (Carroll and Hannan
2000). The entry process looks like perhaps it might be
somewhat different. Examining entry in greater depth
only reinforces this perception. In Table 3, we show a
tabulation by entry mode for those entrants to the market
for which we could find such information. The table also
shows counts by origin industry for those firms not start-
ing anew in the disk array market.
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Table 3 Firms Entering the Disk Array Market by Entry
Mode and Origin Industry
Total De Novo: 45
Total De Alio: 212
Computers 45
Integrators 35
Systems int. 14
Storage int. 19
Server int. 1
Other int. 1
Storage Subsystems 27
Subsystems 22
Subs. Disk 2
Subs. Optical 2
Subs. Tape 1
Storage (Diversified) 19
Value Added Resellers 12
Controllers 10
Software 11
Software 7
Soft. (Storage) 4
Diversified Electronics 6
Controller Cards 5
Distribution 5
Memory 4
Peripherals 4
Computers and Periph. 4
Adapters 3
Computer Add-Ons 3
Hard Disk Drives 3
Computer Upgrade 2
Controller and Memory 1
Computer Server 1
Computer & Storage Subs. 1
Computers/Disk Drive 1
Peripherals & Storage Sub. 1
Boards, Chips and Soft. 1
Motherboards 1
Servers (Video) 1
Storage (Optical) 1
Storage (RAM) 1
Storage Cabinets and Enc. 1
Ethernet Trans. and Hubs 1
Network Products 1
Diversified Other 1
In perusing the table, two features of the disk array
population stand out compared to most others described
in the ecological literature. First, the number of de alio
(lateral) to de novo entrants is extremely high. Our knowl-
edge of many of these firms suggests strongly that most
of them continued with their prior activities for an ex-
tended period after they entered the disk array segment.
Second, among the de alio entrants, the diversity of origin
industries is very high, ranging from highly technical
firms in computers and motherboards to other fairly non-
technological firms involved in distribution and retail.
Both factors figure into the theoretical interpretation dis-
cussed below.
Reconsidering the Theories:
Limitations and Proposals
As discussed at the outset, our purpose in this article is
to examine how and when organizational forms emerge.
Following Po´los et al. (2002), we define an organizational
form as a recognizable code that possesses rulelike stand-
ing. More precisely, a form is an external identity code.
This means that when an applicable organization is per-
ceived as violating the code, outsiders discontinuously
devalue the organization in their assessments and impose
sanctions. Identity codes for organizational forms typi-
cally consist of abstract features as well as composition
rules about appropriate combinations of particular fea-
tures.
We focus on two very different kinds of processes be-
hind the emergence of an organizational form, suggested
by contemporary organizational theory. First, institu-
tional theorists emphasize how formal institutions, such
as industry associations, professional associations, and
regulatory bodies, assist in the establishment of a new
organizational form. Theorists view these institutions as
providing social order and reducing uncertainty, as well
as control or domination. Second, ecological theorists fo-
cus on how proliferation aids in establishing a form. The
theory of density-dependent organizational evolution
holds that as the number of organizations using a partic-
ular identity code increases beyond a critical minimal
level, the code becomes an organizational form (Po´los et
al. 2002). In applying the theory, ecologists often count
the number of organizations (density) in a market across
time.
Our historical review of the market for disk arrays
shows the validity of both theories in describing some of
what occurs in the early stages of a market or industry.
Disk array technology develops out of murky origins and
spawns a large international market. Along the way, two
large and important formal associations crop up and de-
velop. Much as institutional theory would predict, these
associations concern themselves with problems of order,
including especially technical standardization. The estab-
lishment of these associations also undoubtedly served to
unify collective identity among firms in the market to
some extent, for both insiders and outsiders.
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Similarly, as ecological theory would predict, the num-
ber of producers entering the market rises steadily over
the early years, eventually slowing down and stabilizing
and, finally, declining slightly. That is, the characteristic
organizational density trajectory appears, albeit on a short
timeline. In other organizational populations, including
hard disk drives, it appears that the form has gelled by
this point (see Hannan and Carroll 1992, McKendrick et
al. 2000)
From the point of view of the theories, what is prob-
lematic in the case is not what happened in this market
but instead what did not happen. Specifically, there is
little consensus on what it means to be a disk array pro-
ducer, there is no taken-for-granted way to organize for
this market, and there is no established identity code used
by outsiders to evaluate whether a firm qualifies as a
legitimate disk array producer. In sum, there is no orga-
nizational form for disk array production despite the ap-
pearance of formal institutions and the expected trajec-
tory of producer density. So, the theories fall short of fully
accounting for this case.
It is important to recognize that this shortcoming does
not mean that the theories are unhelpful. The factors pin-
pointed by each can still be viewed as necessary condi-
tions for the establishment of an organizational form, but
they no longer seem highly plausible as sufficient con-
ditions. This observation leads naturally to questions
about whether the case can provide insight for further
theory development in this direction.
In examining the possibilities for theoretical elabora-
tion, a number of routes seem potentially productive.
First, the theories could require refinement in terms of the
timing of either or both processes and eventual form gen-
eration. That is, a delay in the timing of purported effects
might need to be more fully specified. Unfortunately, the
case provides few hints about this issue, which seems
more easily addressed in comparative research. Second,
there could be a technological component to the problem.
For instance, it could be that a greater consensus about
the underlying technology is required in addition to the
formal institutions and rise in organizational density. Al-
though attractive to some, we are dubious of this kind of
explanation because it seems easy to point to many es-
tablished organizational forms lacking such a common
technological foundation (e.g., the computer manufactur-
ing form or the early automobile manufacturing form).
Third, it could be that institutional theory about formal
institutions and associations needs further qualification.
One way to refine this theory might be to relate organi-
zational form generation to the level of fragmentation
(both formally and informally) in the relevant institu-
tional environment (Scott and Meyer 1983). For example,
because there are two competing formal associations and
there is no solid consensus within them or across them,
the disk array market has a somewhat fragmented insti-
tutional environment. The difficulty with this approach is
that it is difficult to distinguish clearly between institu-
tional fragmentation (the independent variable) and the
lack of consensus about form (the dependent variable). In
reality, the two often coincide very closely.
What to do? We think the disk array case suggests an
alternative fourth theoretical avenue. In our view, the ob-
served high diversity of origins and other activities of
those organizations operating in this market are highly
pertinent. More precisely, we suggest that the disk array
producer organizational form has not taken hold because
disk array producers come from a heterogeneous set of
origin industries and often retain operations in those in-
dustries, perhaps still deriving the bulk of their revenue
therein. By this view, the problem resides in the identity
basis of firms: So long as firms in the disk array market
derive their primary identities from other activities, and
so long as there are few highly focused firms deriving
their primary identity from disk arrays, then the disk array
producer identity seems unlikely to cohere into a code or
form of its own. Among other things, firm heterogeneity
makes the situation more confusing because it implies
diverse organizational features available for identity con-
struction. Heterogeneity makes self-identification, regu-
lation, and solidarity more problematic; it also makes en-
forcement of the code via sanctioning more difficult. So,
we imagine that there are many other cases of established
markets without specific organizational forms because the
supplier firms are primarily engaged in other identity-
defining activities, which could be vertically or horizon-
tally related to the focal market.
Consider also a counterfactual example from another
context, the beer market. Suppose Anheuser Busch,
Miller, Coors, and others had been the first and only cor-
porations to open brewpubs.12 If they had done so, then
we suspect that a market for freshly brewed beer still
would have developed and perhaps even flourished more
than it did—but a new organizational form would not
have. Instead, there would likely be many local beer out-
lets operating as appendages of the large industrial brew-
ing firms and without much of a separate identity. The
identities of the major brewing companies would domi-
nate this market as they do the packaged beer market. In
other words, an organizational form for brewpubs may
not have emerged without the many focused entrepre-
neurial firms doing only this activity. And note that in
this counterfactual scenario, the major beer producers
look fairly similar on many dimensions; they do not pos-
sess the heterogeneity of disk array producers.
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Figure 6 De Novo Entries
Figure 5 Density of De Novo Firms
If these speculations are valid, then they lead to a re-
formulated specification of the density-dependent process
thought to generate an institutionalized organizational
form. More precisely, we propose that a legitimated or-
ganizational form emanates from the density of focused
producers in a market, rather than total density. The core
idea is that the identity of a form derives from the aggre-
gated identities of individual organizations. When the
identities of individual organizations are all similar and
focused on a particular activity, then they will gel more
readily into a collective identity. When organizational
identities are diverse and diffuse, then emergence of a
collective identity is more problematic.
An advantage of this formulation is that it can be read-
ily incorporated into extant models and theories of
density-dependent legitimation. Of course, precise infor-
mation on how focused all firms in a population are at
every point in time may not be readily available, but some
closely related information likely will be. For example,
for disk arrays our field research and knowledge of many
companies lead us to believe that de novo firms (start-ups
in the market) are much more focused than de alio firms
(lateral entrants). This formulation is also consistent with
the empirical facts of the case. Consider, for instance,
Figures 5 and 6, which show, respectively, the annual
density and entries of de novo producers into the disk
array market. Unlike total density, de novo density does
not rise to a stable point and then subside. Rather, de novo
density appears to be still in a growth phase. More im-
portantly, because it does not level off and is still rising
upward, the trajectory of de novo density does not give
the impression that the organizational form should be le-
gitimated; it suggests instead that the organizational form
is undergoing institutionalization and may not yet be le-
gitimized. This suggestion is, of course, consistent with
what we observe in the market. So, although further em-
pirical research on the issue is still needed, we think the
case warrants our theoretical conjecture about reformu-
lating the density specification.
Although this formulation appears theoretically sound
and empirically consistent with the facts of the disk array
case, it should be noted that it contradicts exactly one
drawn from another popular perspective on legitimation.
Precisely, the so-called sociopolitical view of legitima-
tion holds that endorsement by powerful actors yields ad-
vantages to organizational forms and aids in the process
of legitimation (Scott 1995). It follows logically then that
if and when larger established (powerful) organizations
enter a market, then legitimation should be enhanced.
IBM’s entry into the PC market is a well-known case that
seems consistent with this argument. In terms of organi-
zational density by entry mode, the prediction most con-
sistent with this view would be that de alio density con-
tributes the greatest to legitimation. This is because de
alio entrants will usually be larger and more powerful
than de novo entrants.
We also think that the formulation offered here might
be refined to include spatial agglomeration. Producers of
disk arrays are geographically scattered around the
United States. Surely, such spatial dispersion makes it
more difficult for a collective identity to form and, hence,
may make homogeneity of individual producer identities
more important. Looked at from the other side, spatial
agglomeration may facilitate collective identity construc-
tion. Specifically, agglomeration may make it possible for
diverse actors to recognize and act on their commonali-
ties; it may also make it easier for outsiders to see and
identify the form. An example that appears to accord with
this speculation is New York City’s emerging Silicon
Alley. However, only additional systematic study can tell
for sure the value of this possible qualification.
Discussion
The aspect of industry evolution that motivates the re-
search reported here concerns organizational forms. The
project aims to address a basic question related to the
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evolution of organizational forms and their constituent
firms: When and where will a new organizational form
emerge? Using a precise definition of organizational
forms as external identity codes, we examine two basic
answers suggested by contemporary organization theory.
The first is that formal institutions such as industry as-
sociations and standard-setting bodies will lead to a
taken-for-granted organizational form. The second is that
rising organizational density (number of organizations in
a population) will generate a legitimated organizational
form.
Our historical study of the disk array market and its
associated technologies reveals some limitations of each
theoretical argument. Although we found significant col-
lective activity in association building and standard set-
ting among disk array producers, these did not readily
lead to an organizational form. Likewise, the widely ob-
served trajectory of a rapid increase in organizational den-
sity followed by stabilization did not generate an orga-
nizational form. In sum, both processes have operated as
expected at the start of the population, but neither has yet
produced the expected outcome of an organizational
form.
Why this is the case, of course, must be considered a
speculation. But in our view, a major part of the answer
lies in the diversity of origins and other activities of those
organizations operating in this market. As long as disk
array producers come from a heterogeneous set of origin
industries and continue to operate in those industries (de-
riving the bulk of their revenue from such), then it is hard
to imagine a disk array producer organizational form tak-
ing hold. Why? The problem is one of identity: If firms
in the market derive their primary identities from other
activities and there are few highly focused firms deriving
their primary identity from disk arrays, then the disk array
producer identity cannot cohere into a code or form. In-
stead, the firms operating in the market will be likely to
retain their prior identities, obtained from their other ac-
tivities.
A similar type of “market without new organizational
form” might have developed for local freshly brewed beer
if Anheuser Busch, Miller, Coors, and others had been
the first and only corporations to open brewpubs. (And,
this counterfactual scenario uses producers who collec-
tively do not possess the heterogeneity of disk array pro-
ducers.) That is, an organizational form for brewpubs may
not have emerged without the many focused entrepre-
neurial firms doing only this activity. Instead, we might
have had many local beer outlets operating as appendages
of the large industrial brewing firms and without much of
a separate identity. So, the actual organizational struc-
tures and products might not differ from the present sit-
uation—but their identities as separate forms would.
If our speculations from this case study are valid, then
they suggest a reformulated specification of the density-
dependent process thought to generate an institutional-
ized organizational form. More precisely, we propose that
a legitimated organizational form emanates from the den-
sity of focused producers in a market rather than total
density. An advantage of this formulation is that it can be
readily incorporated into extant models and theories of
density-dependent legitimation. This formulation is also
more consistent with the facts of the case we studied,
when de novo (startup) status is used an indicator of
focus.
Of course, only systematic empirical research will de-
termine the ultimate value of this argument and its im-
plied model. At this juncture, it is certainly premature to
think about discarding the established model of density
dependence (Carroll and Hannan 2000). And, given the
model’s long and established record in empirical tests, it
would seem more likely that a reinterpretation might be
in order. A quick-to-mind explanation for the previous
findings would suggest that the many of the populations
studied did not contain many unfocused producers—or at
least that the unfocused producers appeared steadily in
numbers proportionate to the focused ones, thus simply
leading to a misscaling of density effects. Given that
many of the populations studied originate from periods a
century or more ago, when organizations and commerce
were far simpler than today, this explanation seems plau-
sible.
Failing that explanation, another reinterpretation might
suggest that the effects observed in the established model
could emanate from density-dependent mutualistic activ-
ities other than form emergence. These would include
collective action, development of infrastructure, agglom-
eration economies and the like—all factors discussed in
the original theories of density dependence.
Po´los et al. (2002) also argue for the conceptual sepa-
ration of population and form. Specifically, they argue
that populations are those sets of organizations holding
common minimal (that is, the sharpest) external identities
in a bounded (that is, local) system, and that the emer-
gence of a form depends on the number of organizations
holding a particular identity crossing some threshold
level. In this framework, it is possible to envision multiple
local populations, each holding the same common mini-
mal external identity and none with sufficient numbers to
cross the threshold alone but the joint set of which might.
If the institutional environments faced by the various pop-
ulations are sufficiently interconnected, then a density
count (based on focused producers or otherwise) based
on all the populations might be in order to explain form
emergence. This possibility illustrates how our claims
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here need not be inconsistent with the findings of Hannan
et al. (1995) that legitimation processes operate on a
broader geographic scale than does competition.
By focusing on ecological and institutional perspec-
tives on the emergence of an organizational form, we may
invite objections that we ignore other theories in organi-
zation studies that might offer alternative explanations.
Accordingly, we reflect on our findings in light of three
popular bodies of thought that reviewers suggested were
potentially pertinent: (1) the large literature that considers
how technology shapes industry evolution, (2) the grow-
ing body of work on how the cognitive dimensions of
strategy shape the boundaries of competition, and (3) the
new ideas in circulation about population-level learning.
Consider first the work of Michael Tushman and Philip
Anderson (Tushman and Anderson 1986, Anderson and
Tushman 1990), which puts technology at the center of
population dynamics and is among the most influential
research from an organizations perspective on technology
and industry evolution. In their model, technological pro-
gress is characterized as an evolutionary process punc-
tuated by discontinuous change. Technological discon-
tinuities open up new “product classes,” and alternative
“product forms” compete for dominance (Tushman and
Anderson 1986, pp. 440–441). Technological experimen-
tation continues within a product class until a dominant
design emerges, after which numerous incremental tech-
nical improvements reinforce the established technical
order.
For our purposes, two features of their model hold the
most interest because they seem most directly relevant to
the creation of new organizational forms: the introduction
of competence-destroying product discontinuities, and
the emergence of a dominant design. As described in
Tushman and Anderson (1986), competence-enhancing
or competence-destroying technologies either enhance or
destroy the competence of incumbent firms in the indus-
try. Competence-destroying product discontinuities cre-
ate either a new product class, such as automobiles or
airlines, or substitutes for existing products, such as the
displacement of vacuum tubes by transistors. These dis-
continuities are initiated by new firms, which are founded
on the basis of the new technology and transform the
existing industry structure.
Clearly, on one level this depiction seems consistent
with our argument: New entrants transform industries,
which a liberal reading might interpret as implying that
focused firms facilitate the emergence of a new form. But
while it is tempting to conclude that Tushman and
Anderson (and other scholars of technology and organi-
zation) think technology is responsible for the creation of
new organizational forms, they do not explicitly say so.
Because they use the concepts of product class, industry,
population, and niche interchangeably (Tushman and
Anderson 1986, pp. 446–447), making a precise concep-
tual connection between their theory and the emergence
of organizational forms is problematic. In fact, in their
model, discontinuities occur within the same industry;
they do not create new ones.
Nonetheless, there may very well be a strong link be-
tween technological breakthroughs and form creation.
Our view is that new technology can establish the con-
ditions that might cause an environment to branch and
create a resource space for a new organizational form.
However, not all technological change—even radical—
leads to new organizational forms, and not all new or-
ganizational forms result from a change in technology.13
We find it difficult to specify plausible theory about tech-
nology more exactly at this point; we are left to agree
generally with Romanelli (1991) that any event or devel-
opment could fundamentally alter existing flows of re-
sources, including changes in social values, or human
demographics, and potentially lead to a new organiza-
tional form.
We draw a similar conclusion about the influence of
dominant designs. Namely, there may be an undeveloped
(or implicit) theoretical link between how a dominant de-
sign emerges and how standard setting can facilitate form
generation. As described by Anderson and Tushman
(1990), the dominant design closes the era of ferment
brought on by a technological discontinuity. As with in-
dustry associations, dominant designs reduce variation
and uncertainty in the product class, allowing firms to
standardize parts, establish more stable and reliable re-
lations with external actors, and reduce confusion about
the product class. Industry associations even help to es-
tablish a dominant design, as does the design’s popularity
with users, the market power of a dominant producer, the
actions of industry alliances, and government regulation
(Anderson and Tushman 1990, pp. 615–616). Does a
dominant design help to establish the form? In some in-
stances, technological standardization may indeed con-
tribute to the establishment or legitimation of the form.
But our speculation is that by the time standards are
agreed upon and operative, the organizational form issue
may already be settled one way or another. If not, then
we suggest that the key to determining the effect of stan-
dardization is to look at what, if anything, it implies for
the identity focus of firms. Some standards may enhance
firm-level identity focus, others may not.
A second potentially relevant interpretation may come
from cognitive perspectives on strategic group behavior.
As Lant and Phelps (1999) point out, strategic groups
differ conceptually from populations in that they include
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organizations that recognize each other as rivals; cogni-
tive recognition is not a necessary condition for the ex-
istence of populations. Nonetheless, the creation of cog-
nitive strategic groups could possibly have much in
common with our portrayal of how forms emerge. For
example, Peteraf and Shanley (1997) argue that only
those groups that have strong identities are meaningful
cognitive strategic groups, because only a strong identity
can affect group-member behavior (Peteraf and Shanley
1997). In addition, many strategic groups appear to have
a geographic basis, whether at the national or subnational
level, which enables identities to develop (Porac et al.
1995, Peteraf and Shanley 1997). So, cognitive strategic
groups may, in some cases, be coincident with new forms.
We would suggest, then, that the argument advanced here
about focused identities may apply. In our view, it is a
more positive testable macroexplanation than most cur-
rent theory about cognitive strategic group emergence.
Finally, the literature on population-level learning
(Miner and Haunschild 1995, Miner and Anderson 1999)
considers issues of potential relevance to our study. In
general, population-level learning does not appear to be
about organizational forms. Rather, it “explicitly empha-
sizes changes in the mixes of routines in a population of
organizations rather than the survival and shape of or-
ganizational forms” (Miner and Haunschild 1995, p. 126).
However, one recent extension of the theory appears gen-
erally consistent with our argument. Wade et al. (1999)
show that personnel flows within a population are critical
to an industry’s legitimation—in particular the movement
of founders of new companies from homogenous social
backgrounds (brewers from Germany is an example they
use) and from firms in an existing population. Such ho-
mogeneity (or focus) in careers among members of or-
ganizations in the population contributes to the consensus
about how organizations categorize themselves and their
rivals. It remains to be seen whether an explicit theory
can be developed that ties personnel flows to form gen-
eration.
We conclude on an epistemological note. As this study
shows, the investigation of how an organizational form
emerges and evolves requires the collection of data that
go back to its origins. It is also important to study more
than one industry so that general processes can be iden-
tified. A larger project, of which this study is a part, was
designed with these concerns in mind. We plan to study
and collect data on each of the major technologically de-
fined segments of electronic data storage. These include:
floppy disk drive manufacturing, hard disk drive manu-
facturing, disk array systems, optical storage manufac-
turing, and tape drive manufacturing. These segments are
similar enough in function to allow meaningful compar-
ison; they also develop in distinct enough ways to warrant
individual study. The segments are at various stages of
development: Floppy drives are a mature segment facing
diminishing demand; tapes are also mature but still un-
dergoing innovation; hard disk drive manufacturers com-
pete primarily on the basis of cost but must nonetheless
keep up with unparalleled rates of technological change;
and the disk array business, perhaps the most interesting
of all from an evolutionary viewpoint, is in great flux with
competitors entering from bases of both hardware and
software expertise. A major additional feature of this de-
sign is the potential substitutability of various products
across the segments: This will allow assessment of the
ways that competition processes affect the boundaries of
industries and organizational forms. The project will pro-
ceed through both structured and unstructured research
activities examining each of the primary segments.
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Appendix A. Description of RAID Technology
RAID technology is defined according to seven levels. Each level spec-
ifies a different disk array configuration and data protection method,
and each provides a different level of reliability and performance. In
reality, only a few of these configurations are practical for most online
transaction processing systems, file servers, and workstations. These
seven levels are briefly described below:
• Level 0. Nearly all disk arrays include this mode. RAID 0 distrib-
utes the data across all the disks in the disk array configuration. Because
there is no redundancy, the capacity utilization is 100 percent.
• Level 1. Write data is “mirrored” on two separate disk systems.
This means that every byte of storage used on a system requires that
an equal amount of storage must be provided as a mirror.
• Level 2. This level of RAID has become obsolete. It is seldom
mentioned in most descriptions of RAID technology, and most vendors
no longer sell it. RAID 2 provides a greater than necessary level of
redundancy.
• Level 3. RAID 3 is often referred to as a parallel array because of
the parallel method that the array controller uses in reading and writing
to the disk drives. For RAID 3 it is necessary to provide two or more
data disks plus an error-correcting code disk. Data is dispersed or
“striped” across at least two of the data disks. Each drive is connected
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to a dedicated SCSI channel, which further ensures the performance.
If a failure occurs, the data is reconstructed based on the parity data
on the other disks. The advantage of this scheme is that, compared to
RAID 1, redundancy is achieved at a lower cost.
• Level 4. With RAID 4, data are block striped, not bit striped as
with RAID 3. Blocks of some arbitrary size are recorded on each data
disk. Parity values are calculated and stored on the single check disk
in the same way they are for RAID 3. The cost of redundancy is the
same as RAID 3 because an extra disk must be used to store parity
information. Because there is one parity disk, writes are slow because
only one write can occur at a time. Every write has to write to the same
disk. Block striping makes for faster reads because any request for
information smaller than the size of a block can be satisfied with a read
from one disk. This makes it possible to respond to small reads quickly,
and also to respond quickly to multiple concurrent reads. Thus, block
striped RAID arrays are effective in transaction-processing environ-
ments where small pieces of information predominate.
• Level 5. Like RAID 3, RAID 5 distributes the data blocks over
the disk drives in the system, but unlike RAID 3, the error-correcting
code data is also distributed across all the drives. With this configu-
ration reads and writes can be performed in parallel.
• Level 6. RAID 6 not only mirrors data (like RAID 1) but also
stripes the information. Because the data is striped, the performance is
very similar to that measured in a RAID 0 configuration. The penalty
for use of this configuration is that 100 percent more disk space is
required.
Note that “level” does not mean there is a strict hierarchy, with Level
5 always better than Level 1. The different levels are just different
techniques for data protection with different cost and performance
tradeoffs. Customers evaluate each level of RAID individually. For
example, once firms reach a certain threshold of storage capacity, it is
unusual for them to mirror (RAID 1). If firms are rapidly expanding
their storage needs and adding a large number of disk drives, they might
use RAID 5. But RAID 5 “stripes” data one block at a time across all
the disks, which can cause certain applications to suffer a “write pen-
alty” and slow system performance. Different RAID levels serve dif-
ferent purposes, with different advantages and disadvantages.
Appendix B. Data Sources and Coding Procedure
for Organizational Population Data
The data we use come primarily from Disk/Trend, Inc., a market re-
search company in Mountain View, California. Disk/Trend publishes
annual reports on disk drive arrays, as well as other kinds of storage.
The first Disk/Trend report on arrays was published in 1993. The re-
ports cover every company that makes complete subsystems, boards,
or software specifically intended to permit disk drives to operate as an
array. The reports publish firm-level data on revenues and unit ship-
ments for the largest firms in the industry and in a specific market
segment; typically firm-level data cover 90% or more of revenues and
unit shipments but only 20% of the companies. The reports also list
specifications for each product a company ships, and the date of its
first shipment.
In addition, we compiled event histories for each company identified
by Disk/Trend as an array manufacturer. These histories were gener-
ated by extensive library and online searches, which also turned up a
few companies that made disk drive arrays prior to the publication of
Disk/Trend. In some cases, the event histories revealed shipment dates
that preceded those listed in Disk/Trend and provided more accurate
dates for exit from the array market.
Entry dates were coded as the date of first product shipment. Exit
dates were coded as the last year a firm was listed in Disk/Trend or
else the last year it made a disk drive array if we had more detailed
information. We also determined whether a firm was a de novo or de
alio producer. If de alio, we also coded the industry the firm was in at
the time it shipped its first disk drive array. When firms made more
than one product, we classified it according to its dominant market
(e.g., computers).
Endnotes
1As Po´los et al. (1998a) explain, the organizational form concept plays
three major roles in sociological theory and research (see also Carroll
and Hannan 2000). First, researchers use notions of form to define
populations of organizations for study. Second, form refers to a
selection-favored conglomerate of properties, often embodied in a
structural architecture. Third, the form concept seeks to differentiate
between core and peripheral features.
2The theory developed by Po´los et al. (1999) has the advantage of
combining feature-based, network-based, and boundary-based ap-
proaches to forms.
3Valuation is used here with respect to expectations about the form,
not its social or economic value per se. To distinguish the ideas, Po´los
et al. (1999) refer to their concept as j-valuation.
4We resist the temptation to give any of these definitions special labels,
mainly because we believe it is premature to categorize the concepts
involved.
5There is also a substantial body of research on technology and strategy
that is linked to the issue but in ways not explicitly discussed. We
return to this literature in the conclusion.
6Some very recent efforts avoid this problem by shifting the level of
analysis upward, to the community level (Ruef 1999) or to environment
and social movements within the community (Swaminathan and Wade
1999). We applaud these efforts and think they hold great promise.
However, we also believe that they will not necessarily yield the same
insights as our approach, a position we attempt to demonstrate when
we consider theory in light of the “facts” of our case. In general, our
view is that it is potentially insightful to address important and difficult
problems such as form emergence in a variety of ways, especially if
they show an ability to rise above deficiencies of previous efforts.
7In 1999, EMC acquired Data General, further consolidating its market
position.
8Thinking Machines offered a storage system called Data Vault for use
with its CM-2 system, which it claimed was the world’s fastest com-
puter (Computerworld 1987, Christian Science Monitor 1990). Its array
employed large form factor disk drives.
9RAID is actually an acronym standing for Redundant Array of Inde-
pendent Disks. At some point, RAID 0, which the Berkeley team did
not mention, emerged as a sixth level. But it is really a misnomer. It
is striping without redundancy—a pure play to maximize data transfer
rates.
10The RAID Advisory Board was not a trade association in the legal
sense. It was created and chaired by a consultant to the disk array
industry, and membership fees were used to compensate the consultant
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as well as implement RAB’s mission, which was functionally equiv-
alent to that of a formal association: to clarify RAID terminology, ed-
ucate the market (particularly the engineering community), and pro-
mote common interests among operating system developers and
standards bodies for the fledgling industry.
11Twincom would continue to operate through the end of the obser-
vation period (end of 1998).
12The example is counterfactual in more ways than one. By existing
laws, the major brewers would have been legally prohibited from op-
erating brewpubs, which are small-scale, vertically integrated opera-
tions.
13Consider two contrasting trajectories from apparently similar begin-
nings. One of the cases examined by Tushman and Anderson (1986)
and Anderson and Tushman (1990) is the minicomputer industry,
which most likely became an organizational form by our definition.
They retrospectively trace the industry’s origins (“niche opening”) to
the shipment in 1956 of the Burroughs E-101, which was the first
computer to sell for under $50,000. Seven of the first eight companies
to introduce the new kind of computer were established mainframe
manufacturers, and, by our reading, it became a taken-for-granted form
during the mid-1960s when the term “minicomputer” came into wide-
spread use. According to the official history of Digital Equipment Cor-
poration, the successful introduction of its PDP-8 machine in 1965
“established the concept of minicomputers, leading the way to a multi-
billion dollar industry” (quoted in Kidder 1981, p. 15). Although ad-
mittedly self-promotional, the claim gives support to the idea that the
form became established around that time.
By contrast, during the 1970s a number of companies and reporters
in trade journals began to describe “small business computers.” Just as
the Burroughs E-101 opened up a new niche that came to be called the
minicomputer, so did the Qantel V and Clary Datacomp create a new
niche in the computer market. The small business computer was de-
fined by the International Data Corporation as “small general purpose
computers marketed by the major mainframe manufacturers and their
competitors to smaller businesses and first-time users” (Phister 1979,
p. 520), and they were treated as a product class distinct from main-
frames and minicomputers. But the boundaries between it and the other
two product classes were not very sharp. Its prices, performance and
markets, as well as its producers, overlapped mainframes and minis
(Phister 1979, p. 520). It appears that the producers of small business
computers never cohered into a form, and during the 1980s the com-
puter press stopped referring to them.
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